Challenge Conference Minutes : «Freedom, Equality and Exception in Market Economies»

CHALLENGE CONFERENCE: UNIVERSITY OF ATHENS

Minutes of meeting held on the 9th of November 2006

On the 9th of November 2006, the University of Athens (WP 12) organized a conference titled «Freedom, Equality and Exception in Market Economies» with the participation of the University of Rouen (WP 11), the University of Keele and King’s College London (WP 1), and the Sciences-Po Paris (WP 2). The Conference was held at the «Ioannis Drakopoulos Hall» on the premises of the University of Athens.

The first session, titled «Security and Governance in the Market Economy», was chaired by Professor Nicolas Scandamis of the University of Athens and project manager of WP 12. After a few welcoming words by Professor Scandamis, the floor was given to Professor Sir Neil MacCormick of the University of Edinburgh, who was the invited keynote speaker. Professor Sir Neil MacCormick’s presentation was titled «Market structure in terms of Governance: Intervention in the Market and Security of the Market». In Professor Sir Neil MacCormick’s presentation, the confluence between law, state, civil society and the market economy was the main object. Professor MacCormick divided his speech into four parts. The first was about civil society, civility and market economy, the second concerned market structure and governance in the Rechtsstaat, the third was about market governance beyond the state and the fourth one was about market intervention and security.

The Professor’s first reflection was that civil society is about civil peace, impersonal trust, maintained in part by the state. But the state is a supporter of civility only if it is a law-state. At least from the European point of view, we can say, in perhaps a slightly self-congratulatory way, that the upholding of a catalogue of rights such as those in the European Convention gives our states that quality of Rechtsstaatlichkeit or constitutionality. This is a necessary element of the underpinning of civility. Markets also presuppose civility and require impersonal trust but on the other hand markets need a proper role of the state, which is that of intervening to rectify the market in some degree, providing public education systems, public health services, and some forms of at least a safety net for social welfare. One of the roles of the state in any case – though its extent is controversial – is sustaining social solidarity through schemes of distributive justice.

The state thus guarantees retributive justice through criminal law, and distributive justice through public law. It also has to attend to the demands of corrective justice through its courts that deal with matters of private law, or civil and commercial law. This is undeniably an essential function for law to fulfil in a market economy.

Moreover, states are necessary but not sufficient. We have now achieved circumstances of market governance beyond the state, and we have done so particularly thoroughly in Europe, though not uniquely so. In Europe, through the Communities and subsequently the European Union, we created a system of market governance across the whole twenty-seven member states, with other neighbouring associates of various kinds.

Professor MacCormick concluded by arguing that market economies presuppose security and civility. There has to be security against violent subversions and interventions, so some degree of effective defence against insecurity has to be in place. The point is that people do need to have a sense of common belonging. If people do not have a sense of being valued together as common citizens of a state or other polity, as in the case of European Union citizenship, then the task of effectively being protected against threats from inside or from outside, becomes much harder. That is clearly one of the problems for all those parts of Europe, indeed practically the whole of Europe now, where there is a substantial Islamic minority. Thus, maintaining the conditions of civility and peace requires absolute attention to the conditions of solidarity and requires the strongest possible attention to the prevention of unjust discriminations, although it remains the case that exceptional threats undoubtedly call for some exceptional measures of security. The second speaker was Professor Michalis Lianos of the University of Rouen and project manager of WP 11. His presentation was titled: «The Hegemony of Insecurity: a European Response?». According to Prof. Lianos, insecurity dominates the discourses of States and large institutions; it permeates all levels of existence, from daily life, to biographical courses, to geopolitics. Is a «European» response to insecurity possible, both in terms of governance and otherwise? How could such a response be shaped in line with the alleged ideology of the European social and political model?

The current premises of institutional European responses pay lip service to the abstract identification of egalitarian values and social cohesion. However, there are at least three lines of discourse and action that show how institutional discourses in Europe fuel the current hegemony of insecurity. He identified these as: utilitarianism, «Innocent Publics» and «the Collapse of Prescriptive Normativity».

Concerning utilitarianism, Prof. Lianos stated that providing evidence of socioeconomic utility is an increasingly present feature of both institutional and contesting discourses. Policies, measures and political cultures across Europe converge on seeking legitimacy in «concrete» proof that is used to reduce resistance or reinforce acceptance in «public opinion». One good example is the area of migration where a set of utilitarian arguments has been increasingly rehearsed for at least ten years. The typical sequence consists in arguing that Europe is an ageing continent whose economy needs migrants to survive; by accepting low-paid jobs and contributing to the bottom of the age-pyramid, migrant workers will pay for the pensions of the natives. Therefore migration is not inevitable, it is necessary. The shocking adherence of pro-migration organisations to such arguments exemplifies how insecurity discourses became hegemonic enough to impose the terms on which they can be contested. A less radical, but equally utilitarian, version has developed as a discourse on controlled, targeted and selective immigration, with a battery of arguments on «attracting talent» or «choosing those who deserve to be part of us» and assimilated suggestions.

These «evidence-based» pro-migration discourses may produce a marginal effect on tolerating otherness, a considerable effect on the survival of politicians and institutions and a major effect on reducing issues of social justice to issues of interest and people to secondary resources. For that major effect is precisely the reversal of the nominal objective of such discourses: i) migrants are indeed to be considered as separate from the «native» social body; ii) their acceptance is justified on grounds of economic benefit, therefore unjustified when these grounds disappear. As a result, their status is dependent upon utility; if they are brought in as resources they should naturally be ushered out when they do not serve any longer or, worse, when their time comes to receive pensions and other benefits.

With regard to «Innocent Publics», between the 1970s and the 1990s, the sovereign patronising discourse on which European political systems addressed their societies withered away. This was considered as a significant step towards deepening democracy by increasing proximity between institutionalised politics and society. With the exception of «populism», this discursive alignment is widely considered constructive. Worrying phenomena, such as lack of political involvement or sheer detachment and apathy, are presented as deep crises despite the social proximity and permeability of political discourses. However, the hypothesis that such crises may in fact be partial consequences of «proximate» political discourses appears paradoxical and is not explored.

This state of affairs invites a major question: to what extent is it possible to envisage a critique of European social majorities by major political actors and institutions? There is little to support the view that such a critique is even in the least possible. In fact, contemporary European polities, and the germinating EU polity, are always represented as «subjected» to embarrassing social phenomena and changes. To continue with the example of migration and xenophobia, no responsibility is ever attributed to «public opinion». In fact, the dominant discursive line is that we are all united against xenophobia, racism, ethnic prejudice or the exploitation of migrants and no one specific is responsible for it. As a result of this collective cultural pirouette, led by the political system, internal lines of division do not emerge in European societies and individual positions can remain private. This is an excellent hotbed for generalised uncertainty, and the diffuse fear that inevitably ensues.

Furthermore, concerning «the Collapse of Prescriptive Normativity», Prof. Lianos added that the normative functions of European societies, including the Law, have adapted to the loss of social empowerment and regressed to defensive positions. Both individual and institutional competence is centred on the capacity to avoid risks in all areas, from health to transport, from energy deficits to climate change, from deviance to social exclusion. These defensive measures signal a major change that reaches the very heart of European symbolism. They are replacing prescriptive norms, the fulcrum of European social and political modernity. Individual awareness replaces collective prohibition, considerations replace obligations, consultation replaces decision, collaboration and competition replace conflict, precaution replaces responsibility, and so forth. It is impossible to utter clear choices with clear costs. Prescriptions are disappearing at a fast pace and they take away the social empowerment that they generate through the clarity and certainty of belonging to a delineated social world. In its stead, they leave the social gap occupied by insecurity discourses.

The reversal of these conditions seems to be necessary before a specifically European response to hegemonic insecurity emerges. Refusing utilitarian justification to appease public concern and introduce change is indispensable for maintaining the distinction between insecurity discourse and its opposite, whatever that may be in the particular circumstances. That distinction is a precondition to maintaining discursive space free from the hegemony of insecurity. The relation between political systems and their societies fuels hegemonic discourses by banning socio-political divisions into an imaginative space of universal consensus. It is necessary, particularly so in Europe, to restore and reinforce the attribution of blame to parts of society that can be considered responsible for specific phenomena, according to specific ideologies. Otherwise, the quest for consensus can only be shaped against enemies and threats presented as external to society. Finally, turning normativity into a category of institutional negotiation undermines the foundations of the social bond in European societies. Prescriptive norms and laws are necessary to supply clear representations of collective existence which bar perceptions of European societies as being in crisis or under constant emergencies.

Mr. Andrew Neal of King’s College London and member of WP 1, in his presentation titled «Event, Response and the Clinamen: a philosophy which creates a void», discussed the ancient Greek physics of atomism in relation to the politics of the exception. He argued that exceptionalism is a problem of the limits of the Rechstaat in times of declared emergency. Under these conditions, sovereign exceptions to law, rights and civil liberties are declared. Exceptionalism raises all sorts of philosophical problems regarding origin, cause, necessity and nominalism. He quoted Schmitt, according to whom «Sovereign is he who decides on the exception», an opinion which introduces a circular logic. Exceptional sovereign authority is justified and necessitated by the exception, but it is the sovereign who decides that the exception exists.

In his view, the problem of exception, as a problem of limit, is a real philosophical problem, but here, it is always already securitized. This is the danger of the discourse of exceptionalism.

From one point of view, atomism conceives of the world as infinite atoms in fall, in parallel, like rain. Then the clinamen intervenes, in the form of a spontaneous and infinitesimal swerve of one atom from its course. This causes an encounter with another atom, which then encounters another and so on, causing a pile up of encounters. This is classically used to explain the formation of turbulence or a vortex in a gas or liquid. However, this idea heeds Michel Foucault’s warning against treating historical events as great ruptures,as a «single break suddenly at a given moment, driving all discursive formations.» From another point of view, Negri and Serres considered the above idea dangerous and linked to relativistic contemporary theory.

The Clinamen, consequently, finds a haven in subjectivity, moving from the world to the soul, from physics to metaphysics, from the theory of inert bodies in free fall to the theory of the free movement of living beings. It is the last secret decision of the subject, its inclination.

This has been the idea that Andrew Neal stressed, namely that the ideas of atomism and the Clinamen are a move into subjectivity away from the physics of exception, limit, event and response. Through this, we can refuse to enter the game of sovereign naming and the contestation of the cause, origin, and necessity of the exception. Although atomism cannot be classed as a science and cannot compete as a physics, it is a provocative and deliberate move into subjectivity. It brings the subjectivity of the critical scholar into play in the exceptionalism debate. It is a way of stating that the endless search for the meaning, origins and causes of events such as 9/11 or the London bombings is not a simple problem of knowledge but is already constituted as a domain of sovereign exceptionalism. The idea of the Clinamen is a refusal of this game. The critical scholar can interrogate the reception, representation and naming of the exceptional event, but cannot hope to successfully uncover its true origin and cause. Similarly, the inherent meaning of the event itself is unrecoverable; all claims of necessity are just that: claim to authority, not metaphysical conditions.

In her presentation titled «Forget equality? Security, liberty and the ‘war on terror’ », Ms Claudia Aradau of the Open University of the UK and member of WP 1, stated that the war on terror has rekindled debates about the trade-off between security and liberty. Measures to tackle terrorism are criticised on the grounds of civil liberties. Yet, the argument of ‘civil liberties’ has largely been unable to challenge security. Ms Aradau has argued that it is not simply the predominance given to security in modernity, but the specific way in which liberty is framed that makes it securitising. The new discourses of liberty versus security in the war on terror do not longer oppose individual liberty to state security, but divide forms of freedom among categories of the population. The problem of liberty is no longer that of safeguarding individual liberties from the state, but becomes a problem of arbitrage for the state. The state becomes the arbiter of freedoms to be properly used by its citizens.

Ms. Aradau has argued that the logic of drawing boundaries that is linked with a particular understanding of liberty in liberal modernity is essentially an inegalitarian logic that allows for the identification of security and liberty. Liberty becomes coextensive with security when it is understood as the logic of separation, of drawing boundaries. The problem with the concept of liberty is that it is selective, some aspects of it are dispensable for certain categories of people. Thus, practices of security are essentially related to the intrusion of inequality in political life. She has proposed a new concept of equality whose inseparability from liberty can undo the infamous liaison of security and liberty that is being entrenched in the war on terror.

Equality is not to be understood in substantive (‘equality of what?’) or arithmetic terms (exchange). Following Christoph Menke, equality can be defined as a demand that is raised in an objection to individually experienced injuries. These demands are directed toward the overcoming, by means of more equality, of the very same experiences of debasement, enslavement, neglect, and contempt which first motivate them (Menke 2006). This understanding of equality is neither restricted in the liberal fashion nor in the utopian one. Demands for equality are always raised against all situations which are experienced as injury, as debasement or enslavement. This understanding of equality can buttress forms of liberty that cannot be selectively divided, suspended in the name of security.

Mrs. Patricia McColl of the University of Teesside, was invited to discuss the «Organizational responses to the crisis of Terrorism», where she shared her research experience in dealing with the question of terrorism from the perspective of human resource management, i.e. from the angle of internal organisation, priorities, processes and dynamics. In the exercise of exploring what people think about terrorism in relation with business and management, she found herself drawn into three fields of research. The first concerned research into crisis management and corporate social responsibility.

The second line of research was about risk avoidance, about mitigation and protection of property, but only marginally about protection of people, particularly the protection of the general workforce. A crucial thought of Mrs. McColl involved dealing with terrorism as a single crisis event; terrorism should be rather recognised as an ongoing contextual factor, which, from a contingency perspective of business strategy, needs to be taken into account in the development of business strategy. Terrorism is considered a more or less permanent factor out there, which organisations are going to need to respond to, in terms of securing their survival.

The third theme that was found to be the weakest in terms of the attention being paid to it, was that business needs to take some responsibility for the situation that we find ourselves in.

In her analysis, Mrs. McColl used a rather useful typology of problems which describe different situations, different in terms of their certainty or uncertainty and which call for different types of response. This typology categorizes problems as «tame problems», «critical problems» or «wicked problems». A critical problem is one which is both complex and is demanding a speedy response like a disaster, like some of the kind of terrorist events that we have faced.

As far as the marketing implications for terrorism on business are concerned, Mrs. McColl came up with a framework for levels of analysis within business, analysis on terrorism, and she talked about a primary level, a micro level and a macro level.

The primary level is the level of the individual business, individual firm, individual person, and is concerned with the damages, the injury, and the effects of terrorism.

The macro level is beyond the scope of management studies since it is about the global environment.

This is why Mrs. McColl has chosen to focus on the micro level, which is the impact of terrorism on region or industry and cross industry.

The second session titled «Rivalry of rights in terms of Security: The European paradigm», was chaired by Malcolm Anderson, Professor Emeritus of the University of Edinburgh, who introduced the keynote speaker of the second session, who was Professor Nicolas Scandamis of the University of Athens.

Professor Scandamis’ contribution to the CHALLENGE conference titled «Institutional power to create security: Integration through non-attributed competencies» involved a wide-ranging examination of the concept of security and the institutional responses to it at the EU level.

Thus, Professor Scandamis stressed the fact of the creation of security and insecurity, and that security is not something contingent but produced. Security is neither a legal nor political concept established by scholars. Its essence is that of a practical rationality, rationalité pratique, and because of that it has a de-institutionalising effect.

In the simplest possible terms, security could be conceived as a constant concern about liberty. Liberty, on the other hand, is defined by liberals as not being deprived of one’s chances to exercise liberties.

In the European Union context, the following notions of security are found : first, a political security derived from the very existence of a legal code, the rule of law, as embodied in articles 6 and 7 of the Treaty of the European Union ; an economic security of a very particular nature, evaluative but also as a disciplinary method, which are the Articles 4 and 99 of the EC Treaty ; and internal security in the more traditional sense, for states and individuals, through a harmonisation of values and measures which might be called dispositif de securité, a method for security. The dispositif de securité has as its objective to re-establish the general segmentation that is caused by the mix of the European governments.

Further, Professor Scandamis stressed that the new art of government which is represented by liberalism, consumes liberties and thus, it has to produce and manage these liberties. Liberalism is a manager of liberties and this was appropriately expressed by Foucault, who said that liberalism is about how to be free to be free. Thus, the relationship of liberty is one of production and destruction and the point is who manages this relationship within the European Union system. In this respect, the pillar system should be conceived as creating an institutional split between economic and political organisation. Whereas the first pillar constitutes a new legal order, in the second pillar the state remains, nominally at least, a master. In this perspective, the third pillar which concerns internal security, works along the lines of the second but tends in some respects to lose much of its substance to the profit of the first one, namely as complementing the market for its external threats.

In this institutional framework, the state performs very differently in legal terms. In the first pillar, it is acting diluted in the community method, whereas in the second and the third pillar it stands largely on its own. A security gap is created within the European Union, where we have the market and the management of security by states.

To control this segmentation of power, a kind of a single political governance is created, which operates without abolishing the sovereignty of the state. Examples are Article 99 of the European Community, preceded by Article 98, which gives all the normative values of how we have to understand the economic model that the general economic policy of the state has to observe. Also, the European Constitution, in Article 3/285, states that effective implementation of Union law by the member states, which is essential for the proper function of the Union, shall be regarded as a matter of common interest.

This is a way to create competence, a competence to build up a common logic, to set up specific values and methods, and for the rest, the member states are free to do what they want. A more explicit transition from matter of common concern to an enlarged notion of general interest is made. General interest as well as harmonised normative concepts lead us to the management of security.

Professor Scandamis stressed that security management is a deliberate process of implementing actions to reduce risk to a defined level, which is an acceptable level of risk at an acceptable cost. Also, what is interesting is that the Commission accepts the fact that security is something which comes across everything and the new term in the jargon communautaire is interlinked challenges.

A new set-up of rules is emerging now under the term of intelligence-led law enforcement, based principally on the free movement of information and on the right of equivalent access to data, mainly carried out through networks, such as Europol and Eurojust, which leaves us with the question whether the state really controls these types of networks and how to encounter the new frontiers that are opened ahead of us.

This presentation was followed by Mr. Kosmas Boskovits of the University of Athens, and member of WP 12. In his presentation titled «The figures of security and the device of pillars», he stated that the different figures of security as the crucial object of EU Governance are reflected in their various articulations upon the institutional framework set up by the founding Treaties. More profoundly, they relate to the specific ways in which EU Governance regulates security parameters and related individual rights.

The Community pillar focuses on market security, i.e. the secure functioning of the single market, especially as far as intra-Community flows are concerned. It has actually served as a very efficient regulatory framework for unifying parameters of security in all instances that may endanger the smooth operation of open markets and their physical, institutional and technical infrastructure. The policy-area of freedom, security and justice adds to and expands this power of normative definition and risk management to internal security as such through the device of pillars. In the specific context of the third pillar, EU legal instruments are likely to produce normative outcomes similar but not identical to those produced by Community instruments. Most important, in the implementation phase, the Commission, the ECJ and the individual as agency do not enjoy the full range of procedural rights and guarantees provided for in the EC Treaty.

From the viewpoint of the individual, however, the convergence of normative parameters of security is not complemented by adequate standards and tools of protection against new sources of discretionary power either in the form of EU networks of control and surveillance or law enforcement by national authorities. There is specific need to reflect more thoroughly on the right to liberty and security of the person as subject to executive power in an area without internal frontiers (cf. art. 6 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights).

Last but not least, one should not oversimplify the implications of the proposed abolition of the pillar structure by the Constitutional Treaty with regard to the EU legislative procedure as well as to the rights of the individual in the area of freedom, security and justice. The underlying tension between the rationale of free flows in a unified market and ensuring law and order chiefly by national executive authorities shall continue to leave its marks in the EU constitutional configuration.

Mrs. Rebecca-Emmanuela Papadopoulou of the University of Athens and member of WP 12, in a presentation titled «Protection of personal data and the biometrics practice: the symbiosis of the movement of information, the free movement of persons and the protection of personal data», referred to the legal framework of personal data protection, which consists of various texts: in the first pillar, Directive 95/46 and Regulation 45/2001 concerning the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data on behalf of Member States and Community institutions, respectively; in the third pillar, Europol Convention, Decision setting up Eurojust, Schengen Information System etc.

However, she pointed out that personal data protection has not been so far considered by the EU as a priority in itself, but, according to a «realistic» approach, rather as an instrument allowing for the achievement of other objectives: in the case of the first pillar, Directive 95/46 stresses that the harmonization of the level of data protection in the Member States shall ensure free flow of personal data, thus accomplishing an «objective which is vital to the internal market»; furthermore, in the framework of the third pillar the main acts adopted to this day aim at ensuring that cooperation between national judicial and police authorities will not be obstructed on grounds of data protection. Lastly, the existing legal framework does not apply to data processing operations relating to public security or to State activities in the area of criminal law, thus depriving personal data of European law protection in the most sensitive fields.

In this respect, Mrs. Papadopoulou referred to the annulment, by the European Court of Justice, of the Decisions on the EC-USA Agreement concerning the transfer and processing of Passenger Names Records (PNR) on the grounds of lack of Community competence, which brought inevitably this issue within the field of Member State action; she concluded that following this development, which led to the conclusion of a new Agreement on the basis of second and third pillar provisions, the issue of data protection risks to remain marginal when public security considerations are at stake.

Mr. Anthony Amicelle, of Sciences-Po Paris and member of WP 2, discussed«The European Measures against Terrorism Financing»where he examined the foundations of the discursive and institutional association between money laundering and terrorist financing. Mr. Amicelle argued that the financial issue constitutes one of the main aspects of the antiterrorist strategy, at the top of the international agenda after the violence of September 11.

The immediate result was the adoption by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) of a series of 8 (then 9) special recommendations on terrorist financing. Far from being an innovation, this normative production was inspired by the anti-money laundering regime, which appeared in 1989.

What is interesting is that terrorist financing is not necessarily «criminal», as it may often stem from perfectly legitimate sources. Given that money laundering consists in inserting «dirty money» into legitimate economy, terrorist financing may involve the use of «clean money» to achieve some criminal operations and as Mr. Amicelle put it, this is the case of «reverse money laundering». It is not the origin of money which is guilty, but its destination.

In a next step, he tried to analyse how the reconfiguration of the anti-money laundering regime is constructed as an answer to the intensification of the debates about the so-called and presupposed «new forms» of insecurity.

Mr. Amicelle also stressed the persistence and the similarities in the justification of measures against terrorist financing with money laundering countermeasures, notwithstanding the differences between the two phenomena. Money laundering is perceived to be intimately related to terrorism, in the same way as organised crime and drug trafficking are linked to terrorism even at the European level. So, his speech did not focus only on the analysis of the terrorist financing securitization itself, but as it is combined with the security continuum around money laundering, which establishes an interconnection between different «threats».

In his conclusion, Mr. Amicelle argued that under the discourse of a rational adaptation, the money laundering/terrorist financing couple is the result of a socio-political process, a work of connection underlined by discursive and institutional practices as a consequence of a political will to catch all available opportunities in order to give an immediate response to a situation perceived as urgent. The securitization process around money laundering and terrorist financing naturalizes, renders obvious an association that was not obvious. This association legitimates a reinforcement of the financial surveillance regime and at the same time modifies its nature. This international dynamic exists at the European level, more particularly through terrorist lists and above all with the third anti-money laundering directive, even if their effects (of the countermeasures) on terrorism still remain hypothetical.

In her presentation titled «Liberty and security in the wider Europe: challenges for the Common Foreign and Security Policy», Ms. Funda Tekin of the University of Cologne and member of WP 12, provided an outline of the challenges posed in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and on which the University of Cologne research team has been focusing its research.

Thus, she stressed that the overall challenge for the Common Foreign and Security Policy is to give the European Union a voice of its own. In this respect, due to failures such as the one during the Iraq crisis, an assessment of the record of Europe’s foreign policy cannot be overwhelmingly positive. However, academic reflection has to go beyond the analysis of recent events or short-term initiatives.

In this respect, the strong tools of the foreign policy of Europe as a normative power can be considered to be trade relations, aid and development policies, European Neighbourhood Policy and enlargement. Following these assessments, Ms. Tekin went on to identify two dimensions of the challenges posed for the CFSP : a strategic dimension, concerned with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and the threats that emanate from failing states, and an institutional dimension, regarding the contradiction between Community and intergovernmental structures. As far as the institutional dimension is concerned, the creation of the post of the European Foreign Minister has not unfortunately solved this contradiction.

Furthermore, a brief analysis of the European Neighbourhood Policy was attempted, and its contrast with enlargement policy stressed : whereas for the latter a state can either be a member or not a member of the Union, the European neighbourhood policy tries to overcome this by trying to share everything but institutions with third countries. Thus, its approach is based on two demands : somehow putting an end to enlargement and at the same time altering the nature of the European Union’s borders into borderlands and border regions.

Finally, Ms. Tekin referred to the challenge presented by the EU strategy for the external dimension of justice and home affairs, by emphasizing the need for a proper trade-off between its objectives and those of the CFSP.